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CRIMINAL LAW - ACCESSORY SHIP - AN ACCESSORY 
BEFORE THE FACT MAY BE CONVICTED OF A GREATER 
CRIME OR DEGREE OF CRIME THAN THE PRINCIPAL. Jones v. 
State, 302 Md. 153, 486 A.2d 184 (1985). 
One of three defendants was convicted of conspiracy to commit 
murder and accessory before the fact to first degree murder.! Of the two 
remaining defendants, one previously pled guilty as a principal to second 
degree murder, and the remaining defendant, following a first degree 
murder conviction, was awaiting a new trial. 2 The Court of Special Ap-
peals of Maryland, in an unreported decision, affirmed the first defend-
ant's conviction of conspiracy to commit murder and reversed, sua 
sponte, the conviction of accessory before the fact to first degree murder. 3 
In doing so, the court perfunctorily followed the common law rule that 
prohibits an accessory's conviction of a greater crime than the princi-
pal's.4 The Court of Appeals of Maryland, however, abrogated the com-
mon law rule, holding that an accessory before the fact may be convicted 
of a greater crime or degree of crime than the principal. 5 
At common law, parties to a felony are classified into four discrete 
categories:6 (1) principals in the first degree are the actual perpetrators 
of the crime; (2) principals in the second degree are those who, without 
actually committing the offense, aid and abet the perpetrator during the 
commission of the crime; (3) accessories before the fact procure, counsel, 
or command the principal, but are not present during the commission of 
1. Jones v. State, 302 Md. 153, 155,486 A.2d 184, 185 (1985). 
2. Jones, 302 Md. at 155, 486 A.2d at 185. 
3.Id. 
4. Id. Various common law rules protected accessories from capital punishment for 
felonious crimes. Among these was the rule that prohibited conviction of an acces-
sory of a greater crime than the principal. State v. Ward, 284 Md. 189, 202, 396 
A.2d 1041, 1049 (1978); see supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text. 
5. Jones, 302 Md. at 161, 486 A.2d at 189. Because the defendant died prior to the 
court's decision, the case was moot. Judicial moot ness occurs when "there is no 
longer an effective remedy which the court can provide." Hagerstown Reproductive 
Health Services v. Fritz, 295 Md. 268, 272,454 A.2d 846, 848 (1983) (quoting At-
torney General v. Anne Arundel County School Bus Contractors Ass'n, 286 Md. 
324, 327, 407 A.2d 749, 752 (1979)), cert. denied, 103 U.S. 3538 (1983). Prior to 
Jones, Maryland case law failed to provide a general rule applicable to the disposi-
tion of moot cases. Compare Hagerstown Reproductive Health Services v. Fritz, 295 
Md. 268, 454 A.2d 846 (1983) (remanding to intermediate appellate court with di-
rections to vacate the trial court's judgment and remand with directions to dismiss 
the case), with National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tucker, 300 Md. 156,476 A.2d 
1160 (1984) (per curiam) (dismissing the appeal). The Jones court accepted the ma-
jority distinction between appeals of right and discretionary reviews, holding that 
the proper disposition of a case that becomes moot during discretionary review is 
dismissal of the writ of certiorari rather than dismissal of the entire indictment. 
Jones v. State, 302 Md. 153, 158,486 A.2d 184, 187 (1985). In spite of dismissing 
the writ, the Jones court considered the merits of the case because there was "an 
urgency to establish a rule of future conduct on a matter of important public con-
cern." Id. 
6. Osborne v. State, 304 Md. 323, 326,499 A.2d 170, 171 (1985); State v. Ward, 284 
Md. 189, 196-97,396 A.2d 1041, 1046-47 (1978); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTI, HAND-
BOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 495-96 (1972). 
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the felony; and (4) accessories after the fact provide aid to the principal 
in order to impede his apprehension, conviction, or punishment. 7 
Capital punishment was originally the exclusive penalty adminis-
tered to any party convicted of a felony. Certain procedural rules, proba-
bly designed to mitigate the harshness of the Ubiquitous death penalty, 
emerged from the principal-accessory distinction.8 First, under the se-
quence-of-trial rule, an accessory could not be tried, absent his consent, 
before the principal was tried, convicted, and sentenced.9 Second, the 
greater-crimes rule prohibited the conviction of an accessory for a greater 
crime than his principal. \0 Third, an accessory who incited the perpetra-
tion of a felony in one jurisdiction could be tried only in that jurisdiction, 
even if the actual crime occurred in a different jurisdiction. I I Finally, a 
party could be convicted as principal or accessory only if he was so desig-
nated in the pleadings. 12 
Certain illogical consequences followed from these procedural 
rules. 13 For example, if a principal died without being tried or convicted 
of a crime, the accessory, in spite of the palpability of his guilt, was 
shielded from prosecution.14 Once most felonies were removed from the 
capital offense category, however, the primary reason for the principal-
accessory distinction ceased to exist. 15 Consequently, virtually every state 
7. State v. Ward, 284 Md. 189, 197,396 A.2d 1041, 1046-47 (1978); W. LAFAVE & A. 
SCOTT, supra note 6, at 496-98, 522-23; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 
736-48 (3d ed. 1982); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES **34, 35, 37. 
8. See R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 7, at 751-58; see also W. LAFAVE & A. 
SCOTT, supra note 6 at 499 (identifying the problematic procedural rule that 
emerged from the principal-accessory distinction). Because the Jones case concerned 
the single rule that an accessory before the fact could not be convicted of a greater 
crime or degree of crime than the principal, this casenote will focus primarily on 
that rule, with some attention given to the closely related sequence-of-trial rule that 
prohibits the trial of an accessory before the trial and conviction of the principal. 
9. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 6, at 500; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 
7, at 755; 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *323. An additional reason against 
trying an accessory prior to the final disposition of the principal was the assumption 
that no accessory could exist unless there was a prior judicial determination, via the 
conviction cf the principal, that a crime had been committed. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, 
supra note 7, at *4 n. 38. The rule was also thought to prevent the "absurdity" of 
acquitting a principal but convicting an accessory. /d. at *323. 
10. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *36; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 7, at 
757. A rationale proffered for this rule is that an accessory's guilt is derived from the 
principal's behavior; therefore, his culpability should not exceed the principal's 
guilt. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *36. 
II. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 6, at 499; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra 
note 7, at 753-54. 
12. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 6, at 499; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra 
note 7, at 754-55. This rule required that no variance between charge and proof 
exist. Thus, if one was charged as a principal, he could not be convicted on proof 
that he was an accessory. See Shelton v. Commonwealth, 286 Ky. 18, 86 S.W.2d 
1054, 1057 (1935). 
13. See State v. Ward, 284 Md. 189, 192,396 A.2d 1041, 1044 (1978); W. LAFAVE & 
A. SCOTT, supra note 6, at 498; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 7, at 755-56. 
14. State v. McDaniel, 41 Tex. 229, 230 (1874). 
15. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 7, at 759. 
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has statutorily modified the common law accessory-principal distinc-
tions. 16 As a result, the anomalous consequences of the accessoryship 
rules have disappeared to a large extent.17 
Statutory modifications have not resulted in universal abrogation of 
the accessoryship rules. Although practically every jurisdiction permits 
an accessory to be tried prior to the principal,18 a minority of jurisdic-
tions continue to adhere to the greater-crimes rule. 19 Even so, the major-
ity of reported jurisdictions permit an accessory to be convicted of a 
16. See ALA. CODE § 13A-2-20 (1982); ALASKA STAT. §§ 11-16-100, 11-16-110 (1983); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-303 (1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-301 (1983); CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 971 (West 1970); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-603 (1978); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-8 (West 1972); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 271 (1979); 
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-105 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 777.011 (West 1976); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 16-2-21 (1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 702-221 (1976); IDAHO CODE 
§ 19-1430 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 5-2 (Smith-Hurd 1972); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 41-2-4 (Burns 1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 703.1 (West 1979); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 21-3205 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 502.02 (Baldwin 1969); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 14:23 (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 57 (1964); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 274, § 2 (West 1969); MICH. CaMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 767.39 (1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.05 (West 1964); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-
1-3 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 45-2-302,45-2-303 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 28-206 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 195.020 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 626:8 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-6 (1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-13 
(1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.00 (McKinney 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-5-2 
(1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-03 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.03 
(Page 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 432 (1969); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.155 
(1983); PA. STAT. ANN tit. 18, § 18-306 (1983); R.1. GEN. LAWS § 11-1-3 (1981); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-40 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-3-
31 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1-302 (1982); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.01 
(Vernon 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-202 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4 
(1974); VA. CODE § 18.2-18 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.08.020 (1977); 
W. VA. CODE § 61-11.7 (1984); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.05 (West 1982); Wyo. 
STAT. § 6-1-201 (1983); see also W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 6, at 500 
(summarizing the kinds of statutory changes made to the common law distinction 
between principals and accessories before the fact); R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra 
note 7, at 759 (noting that the trend is toward abrogating the distinction between 
principals and accessories). 
17. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 6, at 500. Statutory reform has not been 
uniform nor has it obviated all the anachronistic procedural consequences of the 
common law distinction between accessories and principals. See R. PERKINS & R. 
BOYCE, supra note 7, at 759 (describing interpretations of statutes that retain as-
pects of the common law accessoryship rules). 
18. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 6, at 500-01; see also R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, 
supra note 7, at 759-60 (stating that the unavailability of the principal does not bar 
conviction of an accessory before the fact); 1 C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL 
LAW 177 (1978) (no longer necessary for principal to be convicted prior to acces-
sory's trial). But see Feaster v. State, 175 Ark. 165,299 S.W. 737 (1927) (the court 
abused its discretion when it permitted the trial of an accessory before the trial of his 
principal when the principal was in custody and prepared for trial); People v. 
Wyherk, 347 III. 28, 178 N.E. 890 (1931) (when principal and accessory are tried 
together the statute requires the conviction of the principal to sustain the acces-
sory's conviction). 
19. See, e.g., Feaster v. State, 175 Ark. 165,299 S.W. 737 (1927); Davis v. State, 267 
Ind. 152,368 N.E.2d 1149 (1977); Tomlin v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 207, 233 S.W.2d 
303, 305 (1950). 
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greater crime than the principaJ,2° especially in those jurisdicitons that 
have abrogated the distinction between accessories and principals.21 
In an early case, Fleming v. State,22 a defendant-accessory was con-
victed of murder, although the actual perpetrator previously was con-
victed only of manslaughter. 23 On appeal, the defendant, although 
present during the commission of the murder, argued that he was an 
accessory.24 Thus, he claimed the court's instructions, which character-
ized him as "aiding, abetting, and assisting," erroneously permitted a 
conviction of murder because his principal was convicted only of man-
slaughter.25 Relying on the statute that abrogated the distinction between 
an accessory before the fact and a principal,26 the Supreme Court of Mis-
sissippi held that an accessory can be convicted of a greater crime than 
the principal once the guilt of the principal is established.27 
On the other hand, some jurisdictions retain the greater-crimes 
rule. 28 In Davis v. State,29 the defendant's petition for postconviction re-
lief was predicated on the proposition that his conviction as an accessory 
before the fact to murder was improper because the subsequent trial of 
his principal had resulted in only a conviction for assault and battery.3o 
The Supreme Court of Indiana stated that "in a situation where there has 
been two separate judicial determinations on the merits of the respective 
cases, and where they are contradictory, the law will impose a consis-
20. See Oaks v. People, 161 Colo. 561, 424 P.2d 115 (1967). See generally Annot. 9 
A.L.R. 4th 972, 993-95 (1981 & Supp. 1985) (for a discussion of the effect of a 
conviction of a principal on the disposition of the accessory's case). 
21. See Bridges v. State, 263 So.2d 705 (Ala. Crim. App. 1972) (per curiam) (statute 
abolishes all distinctions between common law parties and allows an aider and abet-
tor to be convicted of a greater crime than the principal); People v. Hines, 28 Ill. 
App.3d 976, 329 N.E.2d 903 (1975) (under the state's common accountability stat-
ute an accessory's murder conviction upheld even though perpetrator pled guilty to 
only conspiracy to commit murder and armed robbery); State v. Norwood, 217 
Kan. 150, 535 P.2d 996 (1975) (citing to statutory authority to support an acces-
sory's conviction to a different crime or degree of crime than his principal); Fleming 
v. State, 142 Miss. 872, 108 So. 143 (1926) (accessory convicted of higher degree of 
crime than his principal based upon statutory authority). 
22. 142 Miss. 872, 108 So. 143 (1926). 
23. [d. at 878, 108 So. at 144. 
24. [d. at 880, 108 So. at 144. 
25. [d. 
26. The statute read: "Every person who shall be an accessory to any felony, before the 
fact, shall be deemed and considered a principal, and shall be indicted and punished 
as such; and this whether the principal have been previously convicted or not." [d. 
The current Mississippi statute is identical to the above. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-1-3 
(1972 & Supp. 1985). 
27. Fleming v. State, 142 Miss. 872, 881, 108 So. 143, 145 (1926). 
28. See Feaster v. State, 175 Ark. 165,299 S.W. 737 (1927); Trozzo v. People, 51 Colo. 
323,117 P. 150 (1911); Davis v. State, 267 Ind. 152,368 N.E.2d 1149 (1977). See 
generally Annot. 9 A.L.R. 4th 972, 995-97 (1981 & Supp. 1985) (discussing case law 
supporting the greater-crimes rule). 
29. 267 Ind. 152, 368 N.E.2d 1149 (1977). 
30. [d. at 154, 368 N.E.2d at 1150. 
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tency to their findings."3! 
Maryland embraces the common law classification of parties to a 
felony,32 and, until recently, the courts adhered to the sequence-of-triaP3 
and greater-crimes rules.34 In State v. Magliano,35 the defendant was 
charged as an accessory after the fact to the statutory crime of escape.36 
When the principal died prior to his trial, the defendant, relying on the 
sequence-of-trial rule, moved to dismiss the indictment.37 The trial court 
granted the motion to dismiss,38 and the court of special appeals af-
firmed. 39 In its ruling, the court considered itself bound by Maryland's 
constitutional incorporation of the common law of England40 and re-
jected the argument that the accessoryship rules were anachronistic and 
should be ignored.4! The court intimated dissatisfaction with the se-
quence-of-trial rule,42 but concluded that the legislature, not the judici-
ary, was the more appropriate forum for change.43 
In State v. Ward,44 the Court of Appeals of Maryland acknowledged 
the procedural embarrassments sometimes caused by adherence to the 
31. Id. at 159,368 N.E.2d at 1152 (quoting Schmidt v. State, 261 Ind. 81, 82-83, 300 
N.E.2d 86, 87 (1973». 
32. R. GILBERT & c. MOYLAN, MARYLAND CRIMINAL LAW: PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE 25-32 (1983); H. GINSBERG & I. GINSBERG, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCE-
DURE IN MARYLAND 10-12 (1940); L. HOCHHEIMER, A MANUAL OF CRIMINAL 
LAW AS ESTABLISHED IN THE STATE OF MARYLAND 5-6 (1889). 
33. See State v. Ward, 284 Md. 189, 201-02, 396 A.2d 1041, 1049 (1978); Randall v. 
Warden, 208 Md. 667, 670,119 A.2d 712, 714 (1956); Davis v. State, 38 Md. 15,45 
(1873); State v. Magliano, 7 Md. App. 286, 289-90, 255 A.2d 470, 472 (1969); H. 
GINSBERG & I. GINSBERG, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE IN MARYLAND 12 
(1940); L. HOCHHEIMER, A MANUAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AS ESTABLISHED IN THE 
STATE OF MARYLAND 6 (1889). 
34. State v. Ward, 284 Md. 189,205-06,396 A.2d 1041, 1049 (1978); Agresti v. State, 2 
Md. App. 278, 281, 234 A.2d 284,286 (1967). The Maryland courts have indicated 
their displeasure with the greater-crimes and sequence-of-trial rules. See, e.g., State 
v. Ward, 284 Md. 189, 204-05, 396 A.2d 1041, 1050 (1978) (suggesting that reason 
does not support the greater-crimes rule); Watson v. State, 208 Md. 210, 218, 117 
A.2d 549, 552 (1955) (quoting Bishop's characterization of the distinction between 
an accessory before the fact and a principal as a "pure technicality"); Jeter v. State, 
9 Md. App. 575, 582, 267 A.2d 319, 323 (1970) (expressing adherence to accessory-
ship rules based solely on deference to the legislature). 
35. 7 Md. App. 286, 255 A.2d 470 (1969). 
36. Id. at 291, 255 A.2d at 473. 
37. Id. at 291-92, 255 A.2d at 473. 
38. Id. at 291, 255 A.2d at 473. 
39. Id. at 301, 255 A.2d at 478. 
40. Id. at 292, 255 A.2d at 473. 
41. Id. at 298, 255 A.2d at 476. 
42. Id. at 299, 255 A.2d at 477. The court enumerated procedural and substantive issues 
that would require change in the event that the accessoryship rules were altered. 
The procedural issues included where and under what circumstances an accessory 
should be tried and under what circumstances an accessory should be tried absent 
the trial of his principal. The substantive questions included issues regarding degrees 
of culpability and the type of punishment most appropriate for a convicted acces-
sory. Id. at 300, 255 A.2d at 477-78 (1969). 
43. Id. at 300-01, 255 A.2d at 478 (1969). 
44. 284 Md. 189,396 A.2d 1041 (1978). 
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accessoryship rules,45 but still reaffirmed the greater-crimes rule.46 In 
Ward, the defendant was charged as an accessory before the fact to first 
degree murder, even though the principals, in separate trials, pled guilty 
to second degree murder.47 The trial court dismissed the indictment,48 
but the court of appeals concluded that the statutory nature of the indict-
ment permitted the state to prosecute the defendant as an accessory 
before the fact to second degree murder.49 Thus, it reversed and re-
manded with the clear intent that the defendant only be convicted as an 
accessory before the fact to second degree murder. 50 In its affirmation of 
Maryland's adherence to the greater-crimes rule, the court extended the 
rule's rationale to include statutorily created degrees of crime and held 
that an accessory before the fact "may not be convicted of a higher de-
gree of murder than that principal committing that murder."51 
Lewis v. State52 provided the factual circumstances needed to begin 
the judicial reform of the accessoryship rules. In Lewis, the defendant 
was convicted as an accessory before the fact to first degree murder and 
related offenses. 53 In an earlier trial, the principal was tried and con-
victed of first degree murder, but he had not been sentenced prior to the 
defendant's conviction. 54 Relying on the sequence-of-trial rule, 55 the de-
fendant appealed. The court of appeals reversed the conviction56 because 
the principal had not been sentenced prior to the accessory's trial. 57 
Nevertheless, after establishing its authority to modify the common law58 
and discounting any reason for the continuance of the accessoryship 
rule,59 the court abrogated the sequence-of-trial rule and held prospec-
tively that trials of accessories before or after the fact are not precluded 
by the failure to try the principal. 60 
Jones v. State 61 provided the Court of Appeals of Maryland with an 
45. Id. at 192,396 A.2d at 1044; see State v. Magliano, 7 Md. App. 286,255 A.2d 470 
(1969) (affirming the dismissal of an accessory because the principal died prior to 
conviction). 
46. Id. at 206, 396 A.2d at 1051-52. 
47. Id. at 192-93, 396 A.2d at 1044-45. 
48. Id. at 193, 396 A.2d at 1045. 
49. Id. at 200, 396 A.2d at 1048. 
SO. Id. at 207-09, 396 A.2d at 1052-53. 
51. Id. at 206, 396 A.2d at 1051-52 (emphasis in original). 
52. 285 Md. 70S, 404 A.2d 1073 (1979). 
53. Id. at 707, 404 A.2d at 1074. 
54. Id. at 708, 404 A.2d at 1075. 
55. Id. at 707, 404 A.2d at 1074. 
56. Id. at 714, 404 A.2d at 1078. 
57. Id. at 713, 404 A.2d at 1077. 
58. Id. at 715, 404 A.2d at 1079. The court stated that it has a right to alter the com-
mon law when it "has become unsound in the circumstances of modern life." Id. at 
715,404 A.2d at 1079 (quoting White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 354, 223 A.2d 763, 767 
(1966». 
59. Id. at 716, 404 A.2d at 1079. 
60. Id. The court did, however, emphasize that the evidence presented at the accessory's 
trial must be sufficient to establish the occurrence of a felony. Id. 
61. 302 Md. 153, 486 A.2d 184 (1985). 
350 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 15 
opportunity to reevaluate the greater-crimes rule in light of its Lewis de-
cision. In Lewis, the court emphasized the illogic of shielding an acces-
sory from punishment when there was overwhelming evidence of his 
criminal complicity.62 By abrogating the sequence-of-trial rule, it permit-
ted an accessory to be tried and convicted even though the principal had 
not been tried or was never to be tried. In Jones, the defendant's appeal 
of his first degree murder conviction was predicated, inter alia, on the 
greater-crimes rule.63 The court of appeals held that "an accessory before 
the fact may be convicted of a greater crime or greater degree of crime 
than that of which his principal was convicted."64 
The Jones court relied heavily on its earlier Lewis analysis and hold-
ing. The court observed that the Lewis decision already had sanctioned 
an accessory's greater-crimes conviction when the accessory was con-
victed of a crime, but the principal was never tried.6S Within that con-
text, the abrogation of the greater-crimes rule was a mere formalization 
and slight extension of the practical effect of Lewis. In addition, the Jones 
court acknowledged that the Lewis decision illogically made the applica-
tion of the greater-crimes accessoryship rule contingent on the fortuitous 
circumstance of which party to the crime was tried first. 66 Finally, the 
Jones court, again borrowing from its Lewis rationale, argued that an 
accessory should not be shielded from prosecution merely because the 
principal entered a plea or was found guilty of a lesser crime by a sepa-
rate jury. 67 
Jones v. State took the predictable and necessary step of abrogating 
the greater-crimes rule. The Jones analysis, however, would have been 
considerably strengthened by an expanded discussion of the now obsolete 
rationale for the accessory-principal classifications and concomitant pro-
cedural rules. As noted earlier, the statutory elimination of capital pun-
ishment for most felonious crimes obviated the need to protect 
defendants from the ubiquity of the death penalty.68 In addition, the 
existence of many sensible reasons for the principal's conviction of a 
lesser crime than the accessory69 made it unnecessary to equate the ac-
cessory's culpability with the principal's conviction.70 If the Jones court 
62. Lewis v. State, 285 Md. 705, 715, 404 A.2d 1073, 1079 (1979) (quoting State v. 
Ward, 284 Md. 189, 396 A.2d 1041 (1978)). 
63. Jones v. State, 302 Md. 153, 153, 486 A.2d 184, 185 (1983). 
64. Id. at 161, 486 A.2d at 189. 
65. Id. at 160, 486 A.2d at 188. 
66. /d. at 160-61, 486 A.2d at 188. 
67. /d. at 161, 486 A.2d at 188. 
68. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
69. See, e.g., Oaks v. People, 161 Colo. 561,424 P.2d 115 (1967) (accessory's greater-
crimes conviction upheld when principal pled guilty to lesser crime); Combs v. 
State, 260 Ind. 294, 295 N.E.2d 366 (1973) (upholding greater-crimes conviction 
when principal pled guilty to lesser crime); State v. Stocksdale, 138 N.J. Super. 312, 
350 A.2d 539 (1975) (conviction of accessory permitted when principal exonerated 
by a defense specific to him). 
70. Justice Holmes makes this point succinctly: It is revolting to have no better reason 
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had strengthened its reasoning by reference to these indicia of obsoles-
cence, it would have helped to counterbalance the court's virtual disre-
gard for the consequences of its decision on the "appearance of 
evenhandedness in the administration of justice."71 Although the juris-
prudentially sophisticated observer might understand that an accessory 
may be convicted of a greater crime than the principal, the relatively 
unsophisticated public72 may not apprehend that possibility. The ostensi-
ble anomaly of a principal's conviction of manslaughter and his acces-
sory's conviction for second degree murder seriously compromises the 
appearance of justice. 
Finally, the Jones court's judicial activism 73 leaves several important 
accessoryship related issues unsettled. Of greatest significance is whether 
it is proper to permit an accessory before the fact to first degree murder 
to be sentenced to death, especially when the principal may be convicted 
of a lesser crime or no crime at all. By failing to address the propriety of 
such death sentencing for accessories before the fact,74 Jones fails to bar 
the very harshness the common law accessoryship rules sought to 
obviate. 
The Jones court was correct to abrogate the greater-crimes rule. 
The court's decision, however, left unanswered some questions posed by 
the common law rules of accessoryship; therefore, it remains for the leg-
islature to consider the broader picture. Because the original reasons for 
the principal-accessory distinctions have become obsolete, the legislature 
should follow the modern trend and abolish the classificatory distinc-
tions. It would be unwise, however, to permit an accessory before the fact 
to be sentenced to death, especially when the principal, could receive a 
for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still 
more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long 
since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past. 
Holmes, The Path of The Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). 
71. United States v. Standefer, 610 F.2d 1076, 1108 (3d Cir. 1979) (Gibbons, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part), affd, 447 U.S. 10 (1980). 
72. See Krasno, National Survey Examines Public Awareness of Judicial System, 67 Ju-
DICATURE 309 (1984); Slonim, Public Doesn't Understand Justice System: Survey, 66 
A.B.A.J. 1502, 1502-03 (1980). 
73. Prior Maryland case law supports an activist role in abrogating or altering the com-
mon law. See, e.g., Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242,462 A.2d 506 (1983) (abrogates 
common law interspousal immunity rule in negligence cases); Moxley v. Acker, 294 
Md. 47, 447 A.2d 857 (1982) (eliminates element of force in a common law action of 
forcible detainer); Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 438 A.2d 1301 (1981) (modifies 
common law principle that prohibits waiving the right to be present at every stage of 
a criminal trial by the defendant's attorney); Lewis v. State, 285 Md. 705, 404 A.2d 
1073 (1979) (abrogates common law rule that an accessory before the fact cannot be 
tried prior to the conviction and sentencing of the principal); Pope v. State, 284 Md. 
309, 396 A.2d 1054 (1979) (refused to recognize common law offense of misprision 
of felony). 
74. Maryland law provides for the death penalty for first degree murder. MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 27, § 413(e)(1), (d)(7) (1957). But see Osborne v. State, 304 Md. 323, 
332, 499 A.2d 170, 174 (1985) (proscribing the death penalty for accessories after 
the fact to first degree murder). 
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lesser penalty. In that instance, not only is the appearance of justice com-
promised, but the cruel and unusual punishment prohibitions of the 
eighth amendment are implicated.75 Thus, the legislature should insulate 
all accessories from capital punishment, but allow, in all other instances, 
an accessory before the fact to be treated as a principal. 
Michael Carlis 
75. For a thorough discussion of the constitutional issues involved when an accessory is 
sentenced to death, see Dressler, The Jurisprudence of Death by Another: Accessories 
and Capital Punishment, 51 U. COLO. L. REV. 17 (1979). 
